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Abstract We provide a computational model of semantic alignment among com-
municating agents constrained by social and cognitive pressures. We use our model
to analyze the effects of social stratification and a local transmission bottleneck
on the coordination of meaning in isolated dyads. The analysis suggests that the
traditional approach to learning—understood as inferring prescribed meaning from
observations—can be viewed as a special case of semantic alignment, manifesting
itself in the behaviour of socially imbalanced dyads put under mild pressure of a local
transmission bottleneck. Other parametrizations of the model yield different long-term
effects, including lack of convergence or convergence on simple meanings only.
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1 Introduction
Inconsistencies are commonplace in linguistic interactions. Participants can disagree
about the truth-value of a sentence, or about the reference of an expression in a given
context. Such inconsistencies can be rooted in pragmatics, lack of common ground,
perceptual differences, or other non-semantic factors. However, certain misalignments
are clearly of a semantic nature.
Discrepancies in meaning naturally occur throughout the process of language
acquisition and in second-language learning. Their treatment is also crucial when
considering language origins and language evolution. However, variation in mean-
ing is often present among adults speaking the same language (e.g., when they are
forced to collaboratively solve a problem for which they have few or no prece-
dents; see Garrod and Anderson 1987; Garrod and Doherty 1994; Mills and Healey
2008 for evidence in experimental psychology of dialogue). The preexisting indi-
viduated meanings, however, are also subjected to variation, even in the case of
allegedly primitive and frequently used expressions (Brown et al. 2016; Schober
2004).
Inconsistencies occurring in linguistic interaction are sometimes bearable or even
desirable, depending on the goal of the communicative encounter (Fusaroli et al.
2014). However, in many contexts it is beneficial to share semantics: when there is
pressure for efficient communication (Garrod and Anderson 1987) or willingness to
be identified as a member of a group (Labov 2001). Whatever the reasons, experiments
show that participants are capable of reliable and efficient removal of inconsistencies
whenever required (Garrod and Anderson 1987; Garrod and Doherty 1994). To explain
this behaviour, a fully fleshed-out model of interactive semantic alignment is in order
(Pickering and Garrod 2004).
Building upon our earlier work (Kalocin´ski et al. 2015; Kalocin´ski 2016), in this
paper we propose a model of semantic alignment in a population of communicating
agents. Each agent is assumed to assign a meaning to a given expression. Through the
process of semantic alignment, triggered by disagreements in communication, agents
autonomously adjust their individual meanings to fit those of other participants. As a
case study, we choose to focus on semantic constructions corresponding to quantifier
expressions. Mathematical, linguistic, and even psychological aspects of quantifiers
are well studied and relatively easy to capture in a computational model.
In the next section, we describe our model in more detail against the back-
ground of existing approaches to language learning and language evolution. In
Sect. 3, we present the interactive semantic alignment model in its generic form.
In Sect. 4, we focus on modelling semantic coordination in isolated dyads. We
choose a particular space of meanings, simplicity ordering and stimuli which occur
during interactions. We also discuss two main parameters: social influence and a
local transmission bottleneck. In Sect. 5, we test the model by investigating how
various settings of parameters affect plausibility and effectiveness of semantic coor-
dination of quantifiers. We conclude in Sect. 6 and outline some future directions in
Sect. 7.
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2 Related Work
In modelling language acquisition it is often assumed that the semantic system of adults
is fixed and the burden of alignment falls on children (Piantadosi et al. 2012; Frank et al.
2007). A similar assumption is also at the heart of many formal approaches to learning
semantics, not necessarily concerned with acquisition (Gierasimczuk 2007; Clark
2010). On this view, the teacher determines the standard form-meaning associations
which are gradually unveiled to the learner through language use. The learner probes
incoming linguistic input, usually consisting of expression-referent pairs, and induces
a system of general rules for capturing the prescribed associations. Under this classical
view, it is assumed that the teacher does not change their language throughout learning.
Moreover, a successful learner is conceived as the one who is able to eventually infer
the target language. We shall use the term learning by recognizing to refer to such
models.
The assumptions of learning by recognizing do not always translate straightfor-
wardly to other scenarios, for example, to the case of the communication between two
competent speakers, where the roles are not clearly dichotomized into that of the leader
and that of the follower. Even though in such cases keeping or abandoning one’s own
semantics is harder, as long as alignment is valuable to participants, we should expect
that both parties will attempt to align their meanings. The lack of social dichotomy
may also invalidate another assumption usually implicitly inscribed in modelling: the
unalterability of the standard form-meaning associations (with the notable exception of
optimality-theoretic semantics Hendriks and Hoop 2001). Semantic representations
of interacting agents may change in parallel, as a result of simultaneous alignment
(Garrod and Anderson 1987).
The traditional approach to learning is less common in research on language evo-
lution. For example, in collaborative models of semantic alignment, agents’ linguistic
representations are subject to change in local language games (Steels and Belpaeme
2005; Puglisi et al. 2008; Pauw and Hilferty 2012). A language game can ‘fail’ in
many different ways, and such ‘failures’ usually trigger various repair mechanisms
which have potential to alter agents’ cognitive states. Simulations reveal that after
a sufficient number of linguistic interactions, agents’ idiosyncratic languages align
(Steels 2011). Another difference with learning by recognizing is that collaborative
models usually treat agents as equal. Sociolinguistic factors have been investigated
in studies of non-semantic levels of linguistic representation. One of the first models
in this vein explains how an initially unpopular linguistic expression may eventually
become dominant within a population (Nettle 1999). The utterance selection model
describes the mechanisms of grammatical change and explicitly introduces modulation
of grammatical alignment by social influence (Baxter et al. 2006). A similar model
has been used to explain the emergence of dialects (Blythe et al. 2016). A recent
Bayesian model treats learning simple grammatical distinctions, contrasting extreme
cases of social impact where an agent learns equally from everyone in the popula-
tion or learns preferentially from one individual (Smith et al. 2017). Various social
hierarchies have been investigated in grammatical alignment (Gong 2009). On a more
abstract level, social networks have been proven to bootstrap learning in cooperative
games (Kosterman and Gierasimczuk 2015).
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Certain semi-formal models of semantic alignment have been proposed to account
for patterns observed in experimental dialogues. For example, the output-input coor-
dination model (Garrod and Anderson 1987) puts forward that a participant will try to
match their linguistic representations, including semantics, to those used most recently
by their partner. Another influential approach is the interactive alignment model where
coordination of linguistic representations proceeds through a largely automatic prim-
ing mechanism (Pickering and Garrod 2004). Interestingly, Garrod and Anderson
hint at a possible sociolinguistic phenomenon allowing interlocutors in dialogue to
switch between different semantic representations. According to their view, one way
of achieving this is through adopting asymmetrical roles of leader and follower. The
research on non-verbal communication systems evolved by coordination within the
Tacit Communication Game is also worth mentioning here (Blokpoel et al. 2012).
Another line in language evolution research is iterated learning—an individualistic
model of cultural transmission across generations (Kirby and Hurford 2002; Kirby
et al. 2014). Here, a variant of social influence is more evident. In its basic form,
language evolution is modelled as a chain of multiple teacher-learner scenarios. At
any given link of the chain, the follower acquires language by observing their partner,
and becomes the teacher for the next individual, and so on. Clearly, iterated learning
inherits an important assumption from the learning by recognizing paradigm—the
dichotomy between the leader and the follower. Because iterated learning is primarily
designed to model cultural transmission and thus each link in the chain represents a
single acquisition episode, this assumption seems to be justified. Crucially, though,
unlike learning by recognizing, iterated learning does not require that the learner adopts
precisely the same language as the teacher. Quite the opposite—learning is imperfect
due to transmission bottleneck and cognitive biases of learners. The importance of
these factors, though manifesting at a different time-scale, resonates in our model.
Finally, let us mention one aspect in which our model is restrictive when compared
to the work in language evolution. Unlike in the case of signalling games (Lewis 1969;
Skyrms 2010), where a whole system of signals is coordinated, here we consider the
alignment of a single meaning at a time. The optimality of the signal in our case
does not depend on other signals, but rather on various agent-based assumptions. This
significantly simplifies the analysis and allows to look closer at the isolated phenomena
related to the social and cognitive aspects.
Our model steers away from learning by recognizing in the sense that social
stratification is one of the model parameters. This allows us to obtain the standard
teacher/learner dichotomy, as well as other social structures. Moreover, semantic coor-
dination, instead of being performed unilaterally, is a universal strategy employed
autonomously by all agents. None of the agents are privileged to keep their semantic
representations constant, and this brings our approach closer to the collaborative mod-
els of language evolution. Another common point with collaborative models and with
iterated learning, is the incorporation of a local variant of the transmission bottleneck.
The bottleneck is realized by narrowing agents’ perception to the current interaction,
which allows them to test their semantic representations against a small portion of
the environment only. This constraint seems to play an important role in shaping our
language by promoting simplicity and ease of processing (Christiansen and Chater
2016).
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Crucially, the exact workings of alignment are modulated by the perceived social
ranks of the interlocutors and by the input collected during interaction. As such, the
alignment mechanism is generic in the sense that it should be universal over different
social structures and interaction topologies, thus allowing to implement, for example,
diffusion chains or random pairwise interactions. In this paper, we focus on dyadic
interactions and the influence of social stratification and local transmission bottleneck
on semantic alignment in the case of quantifiers.
3 Semantic Alignment Model
In what follows, a population is a finite set denoted by A. To reflect the relative social
standing of agents, we assume that each a ∈ A is equipped with an authority function
wa : A → R. Given two agents, a, b ∈ A, the intuitive sense of wa(b) is that a
perceives b as having the authority equal to wa(b), whereas wa(a) reflects how much
weight agent a assigns to its own opinion. This framework allows us to analyze various
configurations of authority and their influence on alignment.
We use the notion of authority rather loosely. We treat it as a technical term which
may stand for various real-world variables. For example, in some circumstances, social
impact can be measured by age, affiliation, social status, to mention just a few. A
seminal work exploring the role of social factors in language is Labov (2001).
We use H to denote the set of meanings from which agents may choose their current
hypotheses. At this level of abstraction, we do not specify what those meanings are.
However, to ascertain that they carry a semantic content, we posit that there is a set C
of (all possible) external stimuli and that each h ∈ H is a mapping h : C → {0, 1}.
Under this general assumption, each hypothesis classifies stimuli to examples and
non-examples. To link this with linguistic reality, one may think about each hypothesis
h ∈ H as one of possible meanings of a sentence that makes it either true or false in
a given situation c ∈ C .
To introduce cognitive bias towards simple meanings, we assume that H is ordered:
for x, y ∈ H , x  y means that x is simpler than or as simple as y. We posit the same
simplicity ordering for all agents. This is justified as long as agents are equipped with
similar cognitive capacities. For a more fine-grained discussion on the abstract notion
of simplicity, relevant in the context of language learning, see, for example, (Baltag
et al. 2011, 2015).
A typical cognitive structure for representing semantics is an associative map
between expressions and meanings (see, e.g., Steels and Belpaeme 2005). Each con-
nected pair is assigned a weight designating the strength of the coupling. We approach
this in a more simplistic way. In our case, at any given stage t , each agent has one
preferred meaning which it effectively uses while communicating with others.
At the population level, this is described by a function st : A → H . We refer to st
as a synchronic description at stage t . Using this notation, st (a) is the meaning that
agent a uses at stage t . We assume that each agent is acquainted only with its own
semantics, not the semantics of others and has no metalinguistic abilities for explicit
meaning negotiation. There are experimental data suggesting that explicit negotiation
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in spontaneous interaction is rare and does not give rise to stable conventions (Garrod
and Anderson 1987).
Evolution of meaning proceeds in discrete steps t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., each comprising
two stages: interaction and alignment. First comes the interaction stage where several
interactions are realized. A single interaction is represented by (a, b, n, v), where
a, b, n are speaker, hearer and a shared stimulus, respectively, whereas v is the response
of a for stimulus n according to a’s current hypothesis, namely v = st (a)(n).
During alignment, each agent uses an input comprising exactly those interactions
in which it plays the role of the hearer. Moreover, only the most recent interaction
stage is taken into consideration. This is how the local transmission bottleneck enters
the model (Christiansen and Chater 2016).
We represent the input by providing separate lists of stimuli r1, r2, . . . , rm ∈ C
and speakers’ responses v1, v2, . . . , vm ∈ {0, 1}. Instead of giving the list of the
speakers, we provide their corresponding authorities w1, w2, . . . , wm . For example,
given that interactions (a, b, n1, v1), (a, b, n2, v2), (b, a, n1, v3) have been realized
at the interaction stage and assuming that b perceives a as having authority w (i.e.,
wb(a) = w), the input for agent b comprises three lists: stimuli n1, n2, responses
v1, v2 and authorities w,w. Supposing that wa(b) = w′, the input for agent a is: n1
(stimulus), v3 (response) and w′ (authority).
Crucially, apart from external inputs, an aligning agent relies on its own char-
acteristics which include self-authority w0 and current hypothesis h0. Intuitively,
self-authority is to reflect the agent’s resistance to external influences. In practice,
self-authority can make an agent keep to its current hypothesis h0, provided that
external influences are not too high when compared to w0.
An important idea behind alignment is the concept of the reward associated with a
given hypothesis. Intuitively, given an aligning agent, the value of the reward function
for a hypothesis h is to measure how successful the agent would be if it adopted h
during the most recent interaction stage.
Suppose r1, . . . , rm , v1, . . . , vm and w1, . . . , wm is the input for an agent with
self-authority w0 and current hypothesis h0. Given an arbitrary h ∈ H , let z =
z1, z2, . . . , zm be a binary sequence such that z j = 1 iff h(r j ) = v j , for j =
1, 2, . . . , m. The value of z j indicates whether there is agreement between the response
given by the speaker for stimulus r j and the output of h for the same stimulus. If we
add all z j , we obtain the number of interactions in which the aligning agent would be
successful, provided it used h as its current hypothesis. Such a cumulative reward is a
measure of fitness of h to a particular set of interactions. However, mere summing does
not rely on social factors modelled by w1, . . . , wm . Hence, we rather take a weighted
cumulative reward (henceforth, reward), modulated additionally by self-authority and
current hypothesis:
reward(h) =
{
mi=1zi · wi if h = h0
w0 + mi=1zi · wi otherwise
(1)
Observe that if all agents have authority 1, the reward of h is simply the number of
successful interactions that a would participate in as the hearer, provided it used h.
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Additionally, if h is equal to the current hypothesis of a, the reward is increased by the
value w0 to reflect the fact that a is to some extent independent from external social
influences.
Full details of the alignment operator are presented in Algorithm 1. The intuitive
idea behind alignment is as follows: an agent chooses the simplest hypothesis that
would guarantee them maximal reward in interactions from the interaction stage.
Algorithm 1 Alignment Operator
Agent: current hypothesis h0, self-authority w0
Require: stimuli r1, r2, . . . , rm
authorities w1, w2, . . . , wm
answers v1, v2, . . . , vm
Ensure: hypothesis from H
1: for all h ∈ H do
2: for all i = 1, 2, . . . , m do
3: zi := the truth value of h(ri ) = vi
4: end for
5: reward(h) :=
{
mi=1zi · wi if h = h0
w0 + mi=1zi · wi otherwise
 see Equation 1
6: end for
7: R := {h ∈ H : ∀h′ ∈ H reward(h) ≥ reward(h′)}
8: M := {h ∈ R : ∀h′ ∈ R h  h′}
9: return random element from M
Let us briefly go through the alignment operator. The aligning agent computes the
reward for every h ∈ H (lines 1–6). This amounts to computing, for each h, which
interactions would be successful, if it used h in the interactions given by the input
(lines 2–4) and assigning a reward to h (line 5). Next, the aligning agent considers
only those hypotheses that have the highest value of the reward function (line 7).
The agent rejects excessively complicated hypotheses (line 8) and, finally, changes its
current semantics to a random hypothesis from what is left (line 9). We assume that
the probability of drawing an element from M such that |M | = k equals 1k .
At the macro-level, the evolution of semantics may be represented as a sequence
of synchronic descriptions s0, s1, s2, s3, . . .. During the interaction stage at timestep
t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., agents use their current hypotheses, given by st , and then each of them
aligns (Algorithm 1) using its own input. This yields synchronic description st+1.
4 Modelling Dyadic Interactions
In the present work, we focus on the most fundamental and simple interactions per-
formed within dyads. Dyads are assumed to be static in the sense that agents are not
replaced during learning. Restriction to dyads allows us to observe whether the model
works as expected in the basic communicative setting. Moreover, this section gives
all the details which were left unspecified in Sect. 3, namely hypotheses and simplic-
ity ordering. We also comment on crucial parameters (i.e., social impact and local
transmission bottleneck).
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It would be convenient to keep in mind a simple scenario. Imagine two agents
interacting with each other. Upon interaction, several balls are drawn from an urn
containing black and white balls. Agents look at the balls and announce that Blarg
balls are white or It is not the case that blarg balls are white. It is assumed that
the meaning of blarg is the only source of problematic understanding. Misalignment
manifests itself when agents assert different statements against the same set of balls
(one thinks that Blarg balls are white whereas the other that It is not the case that
blarg balls are white). After announcement, agents update their understanding of what
blarg means based on what they hear. In the next sections, we gradually formalize this
scenario and analyze how dyads align for different sets of parameters.
4.1 Meanings
To keep our considerations simple and close to linguistic reality, we choose a small
subset of proportional quantifiers as meanings. The prominent example of everyday
language quantifier interpretable in this way is the English most. However, some and
all can also be interpreted in this way.
Let us pinpoint the concept of proportional quantifiers in a precise way. Consider a
1-place predicate R(x) saying x is white. Now, a finite structure (D, R) corresponds to
a particular set of balls D = ∅ drawn from an urn with R ⊆ D indicating which of the
balls in D are white. In model-theoretic semantics, it is common to identify quantifiers
with classes of models which are mathematical abstractions of reality. This idea leads
to the notion of a generalized quantifier (Mostowski 1957; Lindström 1966). For our
current purposes, we can think of a generalized quantifier as an isomorphism-closed
class of finite structures (D, R).1
Definition 1 A generalized quantifier Q is proportional if there is a rational number
h ∈ [0, 1] and a relation  ∈ {<,≤,>,≥} such that for every structure (D, R):
(D, R) ∈ Q ⇔ |R||D|  h. (2)
Let us see how this definition works for most, some and all. One of the convention-
alized meanings of most corresponds to h = 12 and  =>. Suppose that d balls have
been drawn from an urn with r ≤ d balls being white. This situation is described by a
structure (D, R) with |D| = d and |R| = r . Now, (D, R) ∈ most (i.e., most balls are
white) iff rd > 12 . Similarly, some corresponds to h = 0 and  =>: (D, R) ∈ some
iff rd > 0. Finally, all corresponds to h = 1 and  =≥: (D, R) ∈ all iff rd ≥ 1.
In our analysis, we largely stick to the three quantifiers described above. For nota-
tional simplicity we refer to such a space of meanings by H = {0, 12 , 1}, leaving out
the information about —one should only bear in mind that 0, 12 and 1 correspond to
some, most and all, respectively.
1 For more details on applications of a generalized quantifier theory in natural language see Peters and
Westerståhl (2006).
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4.2 Cognitive Simplicity
So far, we have treated meanings purely extensionally. Extension divides situations
into two kinds: examples and non-examples. For instance, the meaning of a sentence
divides situations into those in which the sentence is true and those in which it is false.
However, this approach is not free from caveats, particularly when viewed from the
cognitive perspective. Therefore, we adopt a refined view on semantics according to
which the meaning of an expression may be identified with an algorithm for computing
its extension (Tichý 1969) (for a broader discussion, see also Szymanik 2016). To see
how this view applies to our case, consider verification of the quantifier most against
finite situations. We say an algorithm computes most if for every structure (D, R), the
computation of the algorithm on input (D, R) outputs the correct answer to the query
|R|
|D| >
1
2 .
The algorithmic approach to meaning proved to give quite robust predictions
concerning cognitive difficulty of verification and reasoning with natural language
constructions, including quantifiers (Mostowski and Wojtyniak 2004; Gierasimczuk
and Szymanik 2009; Gierasimczuk et al. 2012; Szymanik 2016). For example, exper-
iments show that the most quantifier engages working memory, as predicted by the
computational model (Szymanik and Zajenkowski 2010). On the contrary, some and
all do not require additional memory resources, which is explained by the fact that
those quantifiers are recognized by finite automata (Benthem 1986), computational
devices without additional memory.
The above considerations allow us to formulate the simplicity ordering which we
use throughout the paper. We assume that some and all are equally simple and that
they both are strictly simpler than most . Thus, using 0, 12 , 1 for the quantifiers and 
for the simplicity ordering, we have: 0  1, 1  0, 0  12 , 12  0, 1  12 , 12  1.
The restriction to some, most and all is a major one used in this paper. Crucial
comparisons of different parametrizations of the semantic alignment model developed
in Sect. 5 are based on this restriction. However, one may envisage a more compre-
hensive sets of hypotheses. For example, consider a set of proportional quantifiers
corresponding to so-called Farey fractions belonging to the Farey sequence of order
k, denoted by Fk . Fk , for k > 0, is defined as the set of completely reduced fractions
from [0, 1] with denominators not exceeding k. For instance, F3 = {0, 13 , 12 , 23 , 1}.
When considering Fk as sets of hypotheses, we will take  => in Definition 1 for
h < 1 and  =≥ for h = 1. Consequently, we will be able to identify H with a
particular Farey sequence Fk .
When considering a more comprehensive set of hypotheses H = Fk , we posit that
the simplicity ordering is defined as follows: ab  cd ⇔ b ≤ d, for all completely
reduced fractions ab ,
c
d ∈ Fk . This ordering contains the already assumed ordering
for H = F2 = {0, 12 , 1} and matches the cognitive reality to the extent that 0 and 1
are still minimal. However, the assumed ordering predicts that the denominator has a
major influence on the cognitive difficulty of verification of a proportional quantifier.
We treat it only as a tentative assumption. To the authors’ knowledge, no empirical
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account of quantifier comprehension has investigated relative difficulty of verification
between various proportional quantifiers.2
4.3 Stimuli
The result of drawing several black and white balls from an urn is easily represented
by a finite structure (D, R), where D is the set of the drawn balls and R ⊆ D
indicates which of them are white. Note, however, that using (D, R) is superfluous.
All we need to verify a proportional quantifier against (D, R) is the proportion |R||D| .
Hence, we represent the set of the drawn balls by a fraction from [0, 1]. Clearly,
this can be done without loss of generality because a single proportional quantifier
cannot tell the difference between two structures (D, R) and (D′, R′) satisfying |R||D| =
|R′|
|D′| .
On many occasions, contexts we encounter during interactions are unpredictable.
Hence, we envisage stimuli as random deviates of a fixed random variable X assuming
values in [0, 1]. Discrete random variables are sufficient for our purposes (in general,
one may consider continuous random variables supported on [0, 1]). In what follows,
when a particular choice of a random variable is needed, we take X ∼ B(10, 0.5),
which means that each stimulus obtained from X is the result of ten Bernoulli tri-
als with the probability of success (say, drawing a white ball) equal to 0.5 (see,
e.g., Feller 1968). Choosing Bernoulli distribution is not entirely arbitrary because
it is approximated by normal distribution which describes behaviour of many natural
properties.
4.4 Social Impact
In the present account, we investigate positive authority functions. Additionally, we
require that for every a, b, c ∈ A, wa(c) = wb(c). Hence, we may assume that there
is only one authority function w : A → R+ which specifies social impact for each
agent in the population. Another implicit assumption is that w does not change during
interaction.
Taking just one objective authority function corresponds to a situation where inter-
acting agents perceive their social ranks in a similar way. This choice is not overly
restrictive for our purposes because it allows to introduce equality as well as dichotomy
between agents. This is enough to check in what ways (if at all) teacher-learner and
peer-to-peer interactions differ, provided that social influence is stable and does not
change during interaction.
2 Research dealing with the cognitive difficulty of verification of proportional quantifiers is confined to
most, more than half or less then half (and to some and all, if they are viewed as proportional). This gives
us enough justification for the assumed simplicity ordering over 0 (some), 12 (most) and 1 (all). However,
we lack a similar justification for the assumption that, for example, more than half is easier than more than
a quarter ( 12 ≺ 14 ).
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ba
r
hh
v = h(r)
v = h (r)
Fig. 1 Symmetrical dyadic interaction about a shared stimulus r . Hypotheses of a and b are h and h′,
respectively. Agent a announces v = h(r), whereas agent b announces v′ = h′(r)
4.5 Interaction and Local Transmission Bottleneck
We keep faithful to our original example of a dyad using blarg and assume that
both interlocutors respond to any stimulus occurring during interaction (symmetry
assumption). We envisage that interlocutors can share a number of stimuli before
alignment begins. The overall number of shared stimuli per interaction stage is denoted
by n and constitutes one of the model parameters. Observe that by the symmetry
assumption, if r1, r2, . . . , rn are shared stimuli then there are 2n interactions because
each ri occurs in two interactions, namely (a, b, ri , vi ) and (b, a, ri , vi ′). We shall
refer to n as the local transmission bottleneck.
How many stimuli and responses should be directly accessible at the interaction
stage before alignment? In principle, one could allow agents to monitor all past experi-
ence and give them access to all stimuli and responses they have encountered through
their lifetimes. However, this does not sound like a realistic option, particularly in
the presence of the “now-or-never” bottleneck: data occurring in a typical linguistic
interaction are quickly obliterated by new incoming material and only a small por-
tion of it can be effectively stored and used for processing (Christiansen and Chater
2016). Hence, we take a minimalistic approach and assume that just a few stimuli and
responses occur during the interaction stage prior to alignment (Fig. 1, illustrates the
case for n = 1).
5 Testing the Model
We set out to test the semantic alignment model (Sect. 3). One of the crucial questions
is whether the model encompasses traditional individualistic learning as its special
case. We approach this question by looking for appropriate values of model parame-
ters to obtain the desired behaviour. Differentiation of agents’ authorities and the size
of the local transmission bottleneck will be of particular importance. We also check
whether other parametrizations of the model yield different results and if so in what
ways they are different. This should generate predictions of the model for the com-
municative scenarios which are unlike traditional learning. Specifically, we consider
two conditions.
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Authority Condition interacting agents are dichotomized as in the traditional
teacher-learner scenario. This is operationalized by setting
the authority function to make agents differ significantly with
respect to social impact (w1 > w2).3 In absence of this con-
dition, agents assume similar authorities (w1 = w2).
Bottleneck Condition agents interact having direct access to a minimal number of
stimuli per interaction (n = 1). In the absence of this con-
dition, local transmission bottleneck assumes greater values
(n = 2).4
Before we proceed to modelling different conditions, let us put all pieces of the model
together. In what follows, we assume that A = {1, 2} and H = {0, 12 , 1} (occasion-
ally, a more general space of meanings is used, namely H = Fk) where 0, 12 and 1
correspond to some, most , and all, respectively. The simplicity ordering is given in
Sect. 4.2. Given n, we have 2n interactions before alignment begins (see Sect. 4.5).
5.1 Semantic Alignment as a Markov Chain
At this point, it is not obvious how the semantics evolve according to our model and
how they are affected by various parameters. We approach this problem by providing
a Markov chain representation.5
Recall that at a given timestep t , agents interact with each other using their current
hypotheses which are collectively represented by the synchronic description st : A →
H . Then, each agent takes the data from the current interaction stage as input and
updates its hypothesis by running the alignment operator (Algorithm 1). This results
in a new synchronic description st+1 : A → H . Observe that st+1 depends only on st
and the data obtained by the agents during the most recent interaction stage. Hence,
the evolution of meaning implied by our model is a memoryless process—the past is
irrelevant for the current behaviour of the system. Discrete-time Markov chains are well
suited to describe this kind of process (Feller 1968) (see, also, Kemeny and Snell 1960).
One way of defining a Markov chain is to specify a set S of all possible states of
the system and a stochastic matrix [pss′ ]s,s′∈S of transition probabilities.6 A stochastic
matrix is a square matrix of non-negative reals such that each row sums up to 1. The
transition probability pss′ is to measure the likelihood that the state of the system
changes from s to s′ in one step. We give an example of such a system in Fig. 2,
which illustrates a three-state Markov chain of a very simple model describing the
probabilities of weather conditions given the weather for the preceding day.
3 This means that agent 1 is more influential than agent 2. We could instead assume that w2 > w1; the
only thing that matters is that one agent is more influential than another.
4 The difference between 1 and 2 might seem negligible but—as we will see—it affects alignment in a
significant way.
5 To gain a basic understanding of finite Markov chains, see, for example, (Feller 1968; Kemeny and Snell
1960).
6 To obtain a complete description, we need initial probabilities pi , for every i ∈ S. However, pi ’s are not
important for our purposes.
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sunnycloudy rainy
0.1 0.60.5
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.1
Fig. 2 Simple Markov chain. Labelled arrows designate transition probabilities, e.g., the transition from
rainy to cloudy has probability 0.3
We posit that the set of states S is the set of all synchronic descriptions, namely all
functions from A to H or, equivalently, all |A|-tuples assuming values in H . Given
s, s′ ∈ S, the value pss′ designates the probability that the synchronic description
changes from s to s′ in one step (i.e., after a single interaction stage followed by
alignment).
Before we proceed further, let us fix some notation. We write s(1)s(2) to designate
the state s ∈ S. For example, the state s such that s(1) = 0 and s(2) = 12 is designated
by 0 12 . The transition probability from s to s
′
, normally denoted by pss′ , is written
as ps(1)s(2)→s′(1)s′(2). For example, the transition probability from the state s such
that s(1) = 0 and s(2) = 12 to the state s′ such that s′(1) = 1 and s′(1) = 1 is
designated by p0 12 →11. Let xx
′
, yy′, zz′ be states. If pxx ′→yy′ = pxx ′→zz′ = p, we
write pxx ′→yy′|zz′ = p to denote the conjunction of pxx ′→yy′ = p and pxx ′→zz′ = p.
In what follows, we analyze various conditions thoroughly by providing Markov
chains that completely and accurately describe how such systems evolve. A more
detailed explanation of proofs is contained in a separate technical appendix (Kalocin´ski
2018b).
5.2 Bottleneck-only Condition
Under the Bottleneck-only Condition, the Bottleneck Condition holds but the Author-
ity Condition is absent. This is operationalized by setting w1 = w2 > 0 and n = 1.
Theorem 1 Let A = {1, 2}, H = Fk, for k ≥ 1, w1 = w2 > 0 and n = 1. Let X
be a random variable assuming values in [0, 1] with a probability function P. Then,
the model is represented by the Markov chain on S = H2 induced by the following
probabilities:
p01→01 = P(X = 0) + 14 P(0 < X < 1) + P(X = 1) (3a)
p01→00|11|10 = 14 P(0 < X < 1) (3b)
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For all u ∈ H :
puu→uu = 1 (3c)
For all u ∈ H such that 0 < u < 1 :
p0u→0u = P(X = 0) + P(X > u), (3d)
p0u→00|10 = 12 P(0 < X ≤ u) (3e)
p1u→1u = P(X ≤ u) + P(X = 1), (3f)
p1u→01|11 = 12 P(u < X < 1) (3g)
For all u, v ∈ H such that 0 < u < v < 1 :
puv→uv = P(X ≤ u) + P(X > v) (3h)
puv→10 = P(u < X ≤ v) (3i)
Proof A careful determination of all probabilities is a lengthy process which we
describe in a separate document (Kalocin´ski 2018b). Here, we show in detail how
to calculate transitions for u = 0 and v = 1.
Let uv ∈ H2 be a synchronic description. Let us denote by Muva,r∈E the set of
hypotheses for which the value of the reward function computed relative to agent
a ∈ {1, 2}, the state uv ∈ H2, and the stimulus r ∈ E ⊆ [0, 1], is maximal. Let us
consider all possible arrangements of the stimulus r that may affect the value of the
reward function. These arrangements are: (i) r = 0, (ii) 0 < r < 1 and (iii) r = 1.
We need to carefully work through the alignment operator (Algorithm 1).
Let us compute M011,r∈(0,1). The situation is visualized in Fig. 3.
The horizontal line is [0, 1]. We have a stimulus r ∈ (0, 1). The semantics of agent
1 is s(1) = 0 and that of agent 2 is s(2) = 1. Rewards for hypotheses h ∈ H ⊂ [0, 1]
(relative to agent 1) are described above the horizontal line. Below we show that in
this situation, the reward equals (i) w for h = 0, (ii) 0 for 0 < h < r , and (iii) w for
h ≥ r , where w = w1 = w2.
Case (i) Suppose agent 1 used h = 0. It would not agree with agent 2, whose
answer is negative (because it is not the case that r ≥ s(2) = 1), whereas the answer
of agent 1 would be positive (because r > h = 0). According to Algorithm 1, the
reward relative to an agent for a given hypothesis is not increased by the interlocutor’s
authority when they disagree. However, h = 0 is the current hypothesis of agent 1, so
the reward for h is promoted by the authority of agent 1, namely w1, as indicated in
Fig. 3.
Case (ii) Suppose that agent 1 used h such that 0 < h < r . Agent 1 would not
agree with agent 2 for the same reason as in the case (i). Hence, the reward for h is
not incremented by the authority of its interlocutor. The value of h is not promoted by
the authority of agent 1 either, since h = s(1) = 0. Therefore, the reward for h is 0.
Fig. 3 Computing M011,r∈(0,1)
s(1) s(2)
r
w1
0 1
w2
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Case (iii) Suppose that agent 1 used r ≤ h ≤ 1. Agent 1 would agree with agent
2, since the answer of agent 1 would be negative (because it is not the case that
r > h). So the reward for h is increased by the authority of agent 2, namely w2. Since
h = s(1) = 0, the reward for h is not further promoted by the authority of agent 1.
Hence, the reward for h is w2.
We have just proven that M011,r∈(0,1) = {0} ∪ {h ∈ H : h ≥ r}. In a similar way,
we prove that M011,r=0 = {0}, M012,r=0 = {1}, M012,r∈(0,1) = {h ∈ H : h < r} ∪ {1},
M011,r=1 = {0} and M012,r=1 = {1}.
Observe that under the condition that a random variate is r = 0 (or r = 1), agent
1 chooses 0 from M011,r=0 (or M011,r=1) with probability 1 and agent 2 chooses 1 from
M012,r=0 (or M012,r=1) with probability 1. Under the condition that a random variate is
0 < r < 1, agent 1 chooses either 0 or 1 as its new meaning, each alternative being
equally probable. Similarly, under the same condition, agent 2 chooses randomly either
0 or 1. Observe that the events X = 0, 0 < X < 1 and X = 1 form a finite partition of
a sample space. Hence, by the law of total probability, p01→01 = P(X = 0)+ P(0 <
X < 1)/4 + P(X = 1) and p01→00|11|10 = 14 P(0 < X < 1). unionsq
5.2.1 Comments on the Bottleneck-only Condition
By Theorem 1, agents never change to more complicated semantics. They either retain
their hypotheses or change to simpler ones. What is more, the actual change to a
simpler hypothesis leads always to 0 (some) or 1 (all), which are minimal under the
assumed simplicity ordering. Dyads interacting under this condition cannot stabilize
on semantics other than 0 or 1, unless the initial synchronic description is a constant
function s : A → {u}, for some u such that 0 < u < 1. This property is also readily
visible in Table 1, which summarizes certain properties of the Markov chain presented
in Fig. 4. Clearly, the absorption probabilities of the state 12
1
2 (most-most) are all equal
to 0. In linguistic terms, only some or all may emerge through alignment under this
condition, whereas most is not achievable in such a model, unless most was common
to every agent from the start.
Observe that the evolution of meaning in interaction may proceed in subsequent
rounds in the following way: 01, 10, 01, 10, . . .. Interestingly, a similar behaviour can
be observed in many everyday coordinative scenarios (not necessarily pertaining to
linguistic interaction). For example, two people approaching each other from opposite
directions often switch between two incorrect solutions while trying to avoid collision.
The above property of the model is reminiscent of the Lewis’ idea that conven-
tionalized language is a solution to a coordination problem having multiple equally
good alternatives (Lewis 1969). Here, (full) coordination (or a fully conventional-
ized language), means that both agents endorse the same meaning of a signal. When
this happens, the language has already settled down and does not pose any problem
to interlocutors (see next paragraph). However, if the meanings of participants are
not aligned, the postulated mechanism of alignment automatically strives to achieve
coordination. Although the mechanism is targeted precisely at achieving this goal, in
some circumstances it fails to give satisfying results, leading agents to switch their
hypotheses between two simple alternatives which at the time of alignment seem to
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Table 1 Absorption probabilities, expected number of steps before absorption E with standard deviation
SD for Bottleneck-only Condition (n = 1) and Null Condition (n = 2), w1 = w2 > 0, X ∼ B(10, 0.5)
00 1
½0
0.31
0.38
01
0.31
0.25
0.25
10
0.25
11
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
1
0½
0.31
0.31
0.38
½½ 11½
0.19
0.19
0.62
½1
0.19
0.19
0.62
Fig. 4 Markov chain for the Bottleneck only condition, where A = {1, 2}, w1 = w2 > 0, H = {0, 12 , 1}
and X ∼ B(10, 0.5)
be among the best options to choose from. The coordination problem is thus readily
visible as the dynamics of the system unfolds, occasionally resulting in a series of
uncoordinated behaviours.
Figure 4 presents a Markov chain for H = F2 and X ∼ B(10, 0.5). An interesting
aspect to observe is that the resulting Markov chain is absorbing (Kemeny and Snell
1960). This means that the chain contains some absorbing states (i.e., the states that
cannot be left once entered) and that there is a path from each state of the chain to
some absorbing state. Hence, it is in principle possible that, finally, a dyad will attain
mutual-intelligibility, no matter which state is the initial one. Therefore, in a sense,
alignment under the Bottleneck-only Condition may be viewed as a variant of learning.
However, it cannot be viewed as traditional learning because both agents may change
their hypotheses across trials.
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Looking at transition and absorption probabilities alone is not sufficient to assess
the efficiency of alignment. Hence, we have calculated two additional properties of
the model from Fig. 4: the expected number of steps before being absorbed, denoted
by E , and associated standard deviation (Table 1). It turns out that E is relatively low
because it oscillates between 2 and 3.7. Moreover, associated dispersion is equally
small because SD ranges from 1.4 to 2.5. This suggests that attaining coordinated
behaviour under the Bottleneck-only Condition remains within practical limits—a
few problematic exchanges seem to fit time constraints of an interaction and does not
require too much collaborative effort on the part of participants.
5.3 Authority-and-Bottleneck Condition
We proceed to analyse what happens if both Authority and Bottleneck Conditions
hold. We set w1 > w2 > 0 and n = 1. The only difference from the Bottleneck-only
Condition lies in making agents unequal in terms of social influence.
Theorem 2 Let A = {1, 2}, H = Fk, for k ≥ 1, w1 > w2 > 0 and n = 1. Let X
be a random variable assuming values in [0, 1] with a probability function P. Then,
the model is represented by the Markov chain on S = H2 induced by the following
probabilities:
p01→01 = P(X = 0) + P(X = 1) (4a)
p01→00 = P(0 < X < 1) (4b)
p10→10 = P(X = 0) + P(X = 1) (4c)
p10→11 = P(0 < X < 1) (4d)
For all u ∈ H such that 0 < u < 1 :
p0u→0u = P(X = 0) + P(X > u) (4e)
p0u→00 = P(0 < X ≤ u) (4f)
pu0→u0 = P(X = 0) + P(X > u) (4g)
pu0→u1 = P(0 < X ≤ u) (4h)
pu1→u1 = P(X ≤ u) + P(X = 1) (4i)
pu1→u0 = P(u < X < 1) (4j)
p1u→1u = P(X ≤ u) + P(X = 1) (4k)
p1u→11 = P(u < X < 1) (4l)
For all u ∈ H :
puu→uu = 1 (4m)
For all u, v ∈ H such that 0 < u < v < 1 :
puv→uv = P(X ≤ u) + P(X > v) (4n)
puv→u0 = P(u < X ≤ v) (4o)
pvu→v1 = P(u < X ≤ v) (4p)
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5.3.1 Comments on Authority-and-Bottleneck Condition
Social imbalance revamps alignment in a crucial way. An important aspect to notice
is that the most influential agent, unlike its partner, never changes its mind. This
observation suggests that social impact affects alignment as expected. Henceforth, we
use the terms leader and follower to refer to the more and the less influential agent,
respectively.
Observe that, unlike in the Bottleneck-only Condition, cycles of the form
01, 10, 01, 10, . . . are not possible. This follows from our initial observation that the
leader does not change their mind. However, a different kind of cycle can appear.
When the leader uses u such that 0 < u < 1, the follower cannot catch up with them.
This is readily visible in Fig. 5. Indeed, the states where the leader keeps to the more
difficult meaning form a cycle. Crucially, though, these states constitute a closed class
of states from which there is no escape. Hence, unlike in the Bottleneck-only Condi-
tion, the resulting Markov chain is not absorbing: if the leader uses difficult meaning,
the follower can never adapt—the semantics of interlocutors diverge forever.
The above effect is partially due to the cognitive bias that pushes agents towards
simple hypotheses. Observe that if agents differ in meaning and disagree on a given
stimulus, then their maximum-reward hypotheses include either 0 or 1. However, these
hypotheses are cognitively least effortful and thus are finally selected by the alignment
operator. As we shall see in a different condition, this effect may be compromised by
loosening the local transmission bottleneck.
Still though, some amount of mutual understanding is achievable. If the leader
uses 0 or 1, then, eventually, the follower will adapt, accordingly. This property is
00 1
½0 0.38
½1
0.620.38
0.62
10 ~0
11
~1
1
0½
0.62
0.38
½½ 11½
0.38
0.62
01
~1
~0
Fig. 5 Markov chain for the authority-and-Bottleneck condition: w1 > w2 > 0, n = 1. Here, A = {1, 2},
H = {0, 12 , 1} and X ∼ B(10, 0.5)
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Table 2 Absorption probabilities, expected number of steps before absorption E with standard deviation
SD for Authority-and-Bottleneck Condition (n = 1) and Authority-only Condition (n = 2), w1 > w2 +
w2 > 0, X ∼ B(10, 0.5)
readily visible in Table 2: absorption probabilities are set to one for the absorbing
states matching the meaning of the leader.
Another point of interest is that convergence, if possible, seems to occur more
quickly on average than in the Bottleneck-only Condition (Table 2). Moreover, the
expected number of steps before being absorbed drops by 1 (Table 1). The associated
dispersion diminishes as well. This suggests that social imbalance may have a positive
effect on the efficiency of alignment.
5.4 Null Condition
The Null Condition corresponds to dyadic interactions where both Authority and
Bottleneck Conditions are absent. This is operationalized by setting w1 = w2 > 0
and n = 2. We omit the representation theorem. Instead, we give a Markov chain for
H = F2 and X ∼ B(10, 0.5) (Fig. 6).
An important point to note is that the structure of the resulting Markov chain
resembles the one already observed in Fig. 4. Note, however, that certain phenomena
that were present in the Bottleneck-only Condition, now are amplified. For exam-
ple, cycles 01, 10, 01, . . . are almost certain and, consequently, escaping them is
almost impossible. This conclusion receives further support when considering the
expected number of steps before absorption (Table 1). Indeed, E assumes values
ranging from 121 to 513 which renders alignment under the Null Condition as largely
impractical. However, the associated dispersion is equally large, which suggests that
some number of interactions lead to absorption after a relatively small number of
steps.
It is interesting to see what happens if the local transmission bottleneck becomes
less and less tight. It turns out that for n > 2, the switching behaviour is also present
between 0 12 ,
1
2 0 and 1
1
2 ,
1
2 1 and becomes stronger and stronger as n becomes larger.
Moreover, the expected number of steps before absorption and associated dispersion
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00 1
½0
0.47
0.14
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~0
10
~1
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~0
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~0
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0.14
½½ 11½
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0.47
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Fig. 6 Markov chain for the null condition: w1 = w2 > 0, n = 2. Here, A = {1, 2}, H = {0, 12 , 1} and
X ∼ B(10, 0.5)
become progressively larger for bigger n. An example of the Markov chain for n = 5
is given in Fig. 7.
5.5 Authority-only Condition
We proceed to analyse dyadic interactions satisfying the Authority Condition and
lacking the Bottleneck Condition. This is operationalized by setting w1 > w2 > 0
and n = 2.
We restrict our attention to H = F2. The resulting Markov chain is simple enough to
perform precise calculations and rich enough to observe some interesting features, such
as complex semantics formation. In this case, complex semantics is 12 , corresponding
to the most quantifier.
Theorem 3 Let A = {1, 2}, H = F2, w1 > w2 + w2 > 0 and n = 2. Let X be
a random variable assuming values in [0, 1] with a probability function P. Then,
the model is represented by the Markov chain on S = H2 induced by the following
probabilities:
puu→uu = 1, for all u ∈ H (5a)
p01→01 = P(X = 0)2 + 2P(X = 0)P(X = 1) + P(X = 1)2 (5b)
p01→00 = 2P(X = 0)P(0 < X < 1) + P(0 < X < 1)2
+ 2P(0 < X < 1)P(X = 1) (5c)
p10→10 = P(X = 0)2 + P(X = 0)P(X = 1) + P(X = 1)2 (5d)
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Fig. 7 Markov chain for the null condition: w1 = w2 > 0, n = 5. Here, A = {1, 2}, H = {0, 12 , 1} and
X ∼ B(10, 0.5)
p10→11 = 2P(X = 0)P(0 < X < 1) + P(0 < X < 1)2
+ 2P(X = 1)P(0 < X < 1) (5e)
p0 12 →0 12 = P(X = 0)
2 + 2P(X = 0)P
(
X >
1
2
)
+ P
(
X >
1
2
)2
(5f)
p0 12 →00 = 2P(X = 0)P
(
0 < X ≤ 1
2
)
+ P
(
0 < X ≤ 1
2
)2
+ 2P
(
0 < X ≤ 1
2
)
P
(
X >
1
2
)
(5g)
p 1
2 0→ 12 0 = P(X = 0)
2 + 2P(X = 0)P
(
X >
1
2
)
+ P
(
X >
1
2
)2
(5h)
p 1
2 0→ 12 1 = 2P(X = 0)P
(
0 < X ≤ 1
2
)
+ P
(
0 < X ≤ 1
2
)2
+
+ 2P
(
0 < X ≤ 1
2
)
P(X = 1) (5i)
p 1
2 0→ 12 12 = 2P
(
0 < X ≤ 1
2
)
P
(
1
2
< X < 1
)
(5j)
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Fig. 8 Markov chain for the Authority-only Condition: w1 > w2 + w2 > 0, n = 2. Here, A = {1, 2},
H = {0, 12 , 1} and X ∼ B(10, 0.5)
p 1
2 1→ 12 1 = P
(
X ≤ 1
2
)2
+ 2P
(
X ≤ 1
2
)
P(X = 1) + P(X = 1)2 (5k)
p 1
2 1→ 12 0 = 2P(X = 0)P
(
1
2
< X < 1
)
+ P
(
1
2
< X < 1
)2
+
+ 2P
(
1
2
< X < 1
)
P(X = 1) (5l)
p 1
2 1→ 12 12 = 2P
(
0 < X ≤ 1
2
)
P
(
1
2
< X < 1
)
(5m)
p1 12 →1 12 = P
(
X ≤ 1
2
)2
+ 2P
(
X ≤ 1
2
)
P(X = 1) + P(X = 1)2 (5n)
p1 12 →11 = 2P
(
X ≤ 1
2
)
P
(
1
2
< X < 1
)
+ P
(
1
2
< X < 1
)2
+ 2P
(
1
2
< X < 1
)
P(X = 1) (5o)
5.5.1 Comments on Authority-only Condition
We have three types of authority functions that lead to different Markov chains: (a)
w1 > w2 + w2, (b) w1 = w2 + w2, and (c) w1 < w2 + w2. Theorem 3 relies on (a).
The difference between (a–c) is a direct consequence of how rewards of hypotheses
are computed and translates into the degree to which the follower adapts to the leader.
The imbalance introduced by (a) is the most severe one among the three options
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and prevents the leader from mind-changes, provided that the bottleneck is set to
n ≤ 2. However, if the bottleneck was set to n > 2, the leader could sometimes
be persuaded to change their mind. In fact, this is an interesting consequence of the
model: relative difference in social influence is intertwined with the size of bottleneck.
For certain authority functions and sizes of the bottleneck, we would obtain a mixture
of phenomena we have observed so far and those which are observed in the present
condition.
Apart from the conservativeness of the leader, the Authority-only Condition is
similar to the Authority-and-Bottleneck Condition in the sense that if the leader uses 0
or 1 then the follower can catch up with them. However, there is an important difference.
Unlike under any of the previous conditions, agents can change their semantics to more
complex hypotheses. Crucially, the follower can align with the leader on 12 (see Eq. 5j,
5m). Moreover, for a typical random variable such as X ∼ B(10, 0.5), the resulting
Markov chain is absorbing (Fig. 8). After a closer look at absorption probabilities
(Table 2), one can see the true leadership effect—interaction inevitably steers towards
the hypothesis of the most influential agent. Hence, no matter which state is the initial
one, the dyad can eventually achieve mutual understanding convergent with the leader’s
hypothesis. Therefore, dyads aligning in the Authority-only Condition form a replica
of the traditional teacher-learner scenario.
As far as effectiveness of alignment is concerned, the Authority-only Condition
outperforms previous parameter settings (Table 1). The expected number of steps
before being absorbed ranges from 1 to 2.1 with standard deviation oscillating between
0.002 and 1.56. In particular, convergence on most requires roughly 1-3 steps on
average. This suggests that attaining coordinated behaviour under the Authority-only
Condition fits time constraints of ordinary interaction.
Finally, note that the behaviour observed under the Authority-only Condition
requires both social imbalance and less severe transmission bottleneck. This con-
clusion follows from our previous considerations: we have combined Authority and
Bottleneck Condition in all other configurations and we have not witnessed any
behaviour that would count as learning by recognizing.
6 Conclusions
The semantic alignment model specifies a generic agent-based mechanism for updat-
ing the meaning of an expression based on recent input data collected during situated
interactions with other agents. The model steers away from individualistic learning
in the sense that all agents continually adapt their semantic representations. Align-
ment is modulated by three realistic constraints: social influence, cognitive bias, and
local transmission bottleneck. Meanings—here identified with procedures for com-
puting extensions—come with a natural notion of simplicity understood in terms of
a relevant complexity measure of corresponding computational problems. Assuming
a hypothesis space of basic proportional quantifiers and by independently controlling
two parameters, social influence and the size of the local transmission bottleneck, we
are able to assess how their values affect alignment in the basic communicative setting
of interacting dyads.
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1. Agents that are equal with respect to social influence try to follow in each other’s
footsteps and eagerly change their mind whenever they see an opportunity to
imitate their conversational partner. This behaviour hinders semantic alignment
in two ways. First, an interacting dyad cannot converge on complex meanings.
Second, alignment on simple meanings is possible, but rather inefficient. This
is reminiscent of the idea that attempts of communication lead to the problem
of coordination of linguistic representations of participants. Our model shows
how a local convention may emerge in isolated dyads across several interaction-
alignment episodes and that this process is not always efficient or effective.
2. High social imbalance (relative to the size of transmission bottleneck) alters agents’
behaviour in a significant way. The more authoritative agent becomes a conserva-
tive leader who does not change their mind during interaction. The less authoritative
agent becomes a follower who tries to catch up with their partner. This property of
the model resonates well with the hypothesis that an aligning dyad can improve its
effectiveness through imposing local social division between two complementary
roles of leader and follower (Garrod and Anderson 1987).
3. A socially imbalanced dyad interacting through a narrow transmission bottleneck
can align on simple meanings only. The follower cannot adapt if the leader uses
complex meanings. This may be seen as a consequence of the “now-or-never”
bottleneck (Christiansen and Chater 2016). The model presented here thus provides
a formal justification for the claim that the local bottleneck might result in a major
simplification of language during interaction.
4. Significant social imbalance and loose transmission bottleneck allows agents to
efficiently align on complex meanings as well. Efficiency is even stronger as the
bottleneck becomes less tight. Thus, under this condition, we have thus been able
to replicate learning by recognizing: the follower can align on the same meaning as
the leader. Modulo minor changes in the model, replication of main characteristics
of diffusion chains known from the iterated learning (Kirby et al. 2014) should
also be possible within the present framework.7
The above remarks suggest that an individualistic approach to learning semantics,
understood as inferring (perhaps not accurately) the prescribed meaning from obser-
vations, constitutes a special case of a broader phenomenon of semantic alignment.
However, semantic alignment operating in other conditions can still show some signs
of what we may call learning: agents are capable of developing mutual-intelligibility,
although this (i) happens mostly for simple meanings, (ii) is rather less efficient and (iii)
can make both parties revamp their semantic representations. This suggests a more
encompassing notion of learning understood as an interactive process of reducing
between-agent misalignment.
7 For example, at a given learning episode between two agents, one is ranked highly and thus becomes a
conservative leader. Their follower, after having learnt some meaning from the leader, becomes a new highly
ranked agent and leads the way in the subsequent learning episode with another agent, and so on. Since
alignment is modulated by the cognitive biases of learners and transmission bottleneck, we should expect
that the meaning evolving across generations will become simpler, provided no other pressures apply.
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7 Perspectives
The semantic alignment model presented in this paper investigates a few natural con-
straints that can influence agents’ linguistic behaviour: social impact, cognitive bias,
and local transmission bottleneck. However, there are other pressures that can play a
significant role in semantic alignment, expressiveness probably being the most impor-
tant one (Christiansen and Chater 2008). Although we have used the meaning space
that includes more and less expressive meanings, the pressure towards expressiveness
is not included in the present account and thus interaction does not provide agents
with any reason, apart from a combination of social pressures and mutual conformity,
to abide or give up their current hypotheses.
It is not unusual to implement the pressure for expressiveness in collaborative or
individualistic models of language evolution (Kirby and Hurford 2002; Steels and
Belpaeme 2005; Pauw and Hilferty 2012; Kirby et al. 2015). However, expressiveness
has been mainly addressed in relation to language as a whole. Crucially, though, this
notion is also meaningful for individual constructions. In model-theoretic semantics
and its applications to linguistics, it is customary to investigate expressiveness of
individual linguistic forms (Peters and Westerståhl 2006). An important point here is
that higher expressiveness usually translates into higher computational complexity (for
a more concrete analysis in the case of quantifiers see Mostowski and Szymanik 2012).
Hence, the two pressures are likely to compromise each other in language learning,
use and semantic alignment. The question is whether this trade-off might have some
deeper bearing on language (see, for example, Kalocin´ski and Godziszewski 2018).
A related research question concerns the relationship between the structure of the
lexicon of a given community and the structure of environment in which this commu-
nity is immersed and communicates about. As far as spatial descriptions are concerned,
it has been observed that languages relying on an absolute frame of reference are more
common for rural or open-terrain societies, whereas relative frame of reference tends
to be found in densely forested and urban environments (Levinson 1996, 2003; Majid
et al. 2004). Moreover, it has been suggested that regional daylight characteristics
might influence the structure of color categories of local communities (Lindsey and
Brown 2002; Plewczyn´ski et al. 2014). It seems natural to ask a similar question in
the context of quantification and determine whether distributional characteristics of
the properties that agents communicate about (probability distributions on stimuli)
influence the structure of the emerging quantifier lexicons. Apart from the research
on quantification in the multi-agent context (Gierasimczuk and Szymanik 2011; Pauw
and Hilferty 2012), it has recently been argued that certain properties of the environ-
ment can have a significant influence on the evolution of scalar terms, and in particular,
of quantifiers (Kalocin´ski 2018a). Finally, the relationship between the structure of
the environment and the structure of the lexicon has been studied extensively in the
signalling games paradigm, in the context of Voronoi languages (Jäger et al. 2011),
vagueness (O’Connor 2014), or compositionality (Steinert-Threlkeld 2016).
123
250 D. Kalocin´ski et al.
7.1 Alignment in Dialogue
Our analysis of dyadic interactions might raise the question of the model’s applicability
to semantic coordination in dialogue. Having this in mind, we point to main advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed approach.
Let us start with the good news. First, observe that alignment proceeds through
simple priming—an agent, instead of modelling mental states of its partner, con-
sistently adapts its own hypothesis relying on the most recent input obtained from
its interlocutor (Pickering and Garrod 2004). Second, negotiation of meaning is not
explicit—it proceeds through tacit modifications based on observed examples of lan-
guage use. This property of alignment matches findings known from the experimental
psychology of dialogue (Garrod and Anderson 1987; Garrod and Doherty 1994). Third,
alignment is mainly driven by miscommunication—agents change their hypotheses
on encountering problematic usage. This aspect of the model also resonates well with
experimental research (Healey 2008). Fourth, alignment can operate on input gathered
from a number of discussants and thus extends naturally to multi-party dialogues. Last
but not least, alignment is vulnerable to social influence. The latter property fits with
the proposal according to which social influence might be exploited by participants
to facilitate alignment (Garrod and Anderson 1987). Indeed, we have seen that social
imbalance has a largely positive impact on the effectiveness of alignment.
Time for the bad news. The present account does not distinguish between separate
turns. Turn-taking is a defining feature of dialogue and should be incorporated into
modelling (Levinson 2016). The question is what would change if we divided a single
interaction-alignment episode into two separate turns with the roles of the speaker and
the hearer exchanged. It seems that socially balanced dyads would be more effective,
provided that only one agent (presumably, the hearer) aligns per turn. We hypothesise,
however, that this would not completely reduce the threat of misalignment, as long as
the aligning agent has several equally good alternatives to choose from.
Another crucial assumption involved in the present account is that authority func-
tions are positive and remain constant throughout interaction. This seems to be
adequate for certain communicative scenarios—for example, when changing the rel-
ative social standing of agents is difficult or mutually recognized as inappropriate.
However, abandoning these assumptions naturally extends the model to competitive
scenarios. Moreover, allowing authority functions to vary across trials leads to an inter-
esting theme of modelling social coordination. All these modifications taken together
seem to provide an interesting challenge, particularly in connection to semantic align-
ment.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
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